















The Report Committee for Andrew Joel Stravers 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following report 
 
 
American Military Presence Abroad: 














Patrick J. McDonald 




American Military Presence Abroad: 








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Arts  
 
 



















American Military Presence Abroad: 
Trends and Analysis 
 
Andrew Joel Stravers, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Patrick J. McDonald 
 
This paper examines one basic question: what explains trends in American 
military deployments abroad? In other words, why does the U.S. military establish a non-
combat presence in particular countries and at particular times? Scholars have posited 
two main answers to this question. First, many authors consider basing a purely strategic 
consideration rooted in Great Power rivalries, weapons technology, and polarity. Second, 
research since the Cold War has mainly considered basing within the context of the 
regime structure of the host country, with some regime types (democracies) better suited 
as basing partners than others. This paper examines time series cross-sectional statistical 
evidence for each, and it concludes that while each strain of thought provides valuable 
contributions to our understanding of basing trends, none fully explain American basing 
outcomes.  
I propose a theory in which the main driver of basing trends comes from within 
the United States. In other words, domestic political considerations within the American 
system of government best explain variations in American basing abroad. Presidential 
incentives, for instance, arise from a national constituency that judges him on how 
effectively he carries out the U.S. military’s missions. However, congressional incentives 
 vi 
are such that individual representatives prefer to bring American forces back onto U.S. 
soil so that they may take advantage of the economic benefits that the troops provide to 
their home districts and to constrain the president’s power. As such, the long-term trend 
since 1950 is toward less overseas basing and more basing within the United States. 
Previous studies provided insights into the international determinants of American 
foreign basing. This study adds domestic American politics to the overall puzzle, leading 
to a more complete understanding of the intersection between foreign and domestic 
dynamics as regards the international deployment of American forces.  
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